Excerpts from 'The Taiwan Crisis' -- Banned in China (3) Print
Think Tank
Professor Yuan Hongbin   

Chapter 2: Annex Taiwan Without A Battle by 2012

- China’s Classified Political Strategies

1. The certainty of the China’s political strategy towards Taiwan

Rational or irrational?

Taiwan is a thorn in the heart of Chinese officials. To the older Mao Zedong generation, settling the Taiwan problem would mean finally ending the love-hate relationship between the CCP and the KMT. Only then can that generation fulfill their ultimate political passions. Finally, Communist China can celebrate a complete victory and end this chapter of history.

During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping declared in a publicized document from a secret central conference, that the Taiwan problem had to be resolved within the next 10 years. Those plans were only delayed because the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 dealt a heavy blow to the CCP and Deng Xiaoping’s political power.

To the new Chinese officials like Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, Taiwan is also a thorn in their heart -- a thorn that is deeply wedged.

Political example

Soviet power in Eastern Europe suddenly dissolved in the people’s revolution. Communist China’s own moral foundations collapsed during the Tiananmen Square Incident. These are the extreme conditions in which the new generation of Chinese officials came into power.

Coincidently, in almost the exact same era, Taiwan freed itself from the shadow of authoritarian governance and started heading towards a free democracy. The meaning of Taiwan’s democracy goes beyond itself. The new Chinese leadership realizes that Taiwan’s democracy offer the 1.5 billion Chinese a political example. This democracy is an immediate and fatal threat to the totalitarian regime. To defend their own existence, Chinese officials have called for unification and developed precise political strategies to control and eventually exterminate Taiwan’s democracy.

In addition, after the Tiananmen Square Incident, the tyrannical government attempted to justify their rule through economic development and rebuilding. However, although the CCP elite market system resulted in enormous economic growth, it also created an extremely wide wealth gap. The dissatisfaction and anger resulting from this economic inequality has exceeded what economic growth can pacify. Under such circumstances, the Chinese officials must quickly wave their flags of nationalism, distracting discontents to be a “national hero” and settle the Taiwan problem. Thus, they can rightfully use the iron fist to suppress any resistance in China.

Deng Xiaoping's political will

In his political will, Deng Xiaoping left a recording before he died regarding the Taiwan problem. It is still considered top secret. At the time, it was only heard by level one members in the Politburo and grade one military officials. Quoted below is the most crucial section to Deng Xiaoping’s will:

“… … Over the past years, advocates of freedom in the bourgeois class within and outside of the CCP are itching to follow the so-called ‘Taiwan experience.’ There are even people who advise us to learn from Jiang Jinggou and end the ban on political parties. This political news should alert us to be much more vigilant. We must clearly educate the party members that the Taiwan problem has exceeded beyond our grudge against the KMT. … … Settling the Taiwan problem directly affects the existence of the CCP and Socialism in China. … … We must create conditions to quickly solve the Taiwan problem. Taiwan is different from Hong Kong. Hong Kong had a lease, so after 100 years we could still resolve the situation. Taiwan does not have a lease. If we continue prolonging the situation, the problem will become more disadvantageous and difficult for us to solve. … … The Taiwan problem must be resolved by the end of Comrade Hu Jingtao’s second term. Do not exceed the year 2012. I hope that the 18th Congress will also be the celebration for solving the Taiwan problem. … … Comrade Jiang Zemin, do not fight for power or act rashly. You must steadfastly create optimal conditions for Comrade Jiang Zemin to settle the Taiwan problem. Chairman Mao, myself, and many other elderly comrades have been preparing the conditions for solving the Taiwan problem for decades. Comrade Hu Jintao will be the one to represent our party and consummate our efforts.”

Deng Xiaoping’s will uses classic CCP culture language. This clever elderly Chinese politician realized that Taiwan’s free democracy is a fatal threat because it sets an alternative example for the Chinese. Thus, he declares that “solving the Taiwan problem” is the essential method for extinguishing deadly political threats.

Just before Jiang Zemin handed over chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, his close ally Chen Liangyu earnestly urged him to start a war over the Taiwan Strait. By declaring a state of war, Jiang would be able to continue holding his post and would not have to step aside for Hu Jingtao. In 2001, after Wang Shouye became the deputy commander of the navy, he wrote a letter in blood advising Jiang to decisively resolve the Taiwan Problem. Jiang declined to do so, not because he was worried that the US would get involved, but because Deng Xiaoping already warned him in the will not to compete for power. Jiang worried that starting a war with Taiwan in order to delay the transition of power to Hu would spark a tide of negativity towards Jiang within the party.

Jiang understood the many grudges that would arise with a power struggle and chose not to get involved. On the other hand, Chen and Wang dug their own graves. In 2005, when Hu succeeded Jiang as chairman of the Central Military Commission, Hu immediately had Wang investigated and arrested. Wang was sentenced by the Central Military to the death penalty with a two year suspension. Even as a member of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, Chen could not escape prison. Both Wang and Chen were sentenced on corruption charges. In China, where there are no uncorrupt officials, such charges are a way to defame and eliminate opponents in the power struggle. Moreover, in China it is impossible for a politician to recover after being found guilty. Corruption charges are beyond redemption. Hu Jintao himself is vicious.

'Peaceful development'

In 2002, after Hu Jintao became the Party General Secretary, he publicly called for “Peaceful Development.” However, that was just a ploy. In secrecy, Hu was pushing to take Taiwan using primarily military force by 2012, before the 18th Congress. In early 2008, the Chinese government noted the possibility that the KMT might win the elections and return to power in Taiwan. Over the eight years since the KMT had lost their ruling power, the Chinese government intentionally proceeded to buy over upper class members of the KMT. Countless upper class families already had businesses and firms on the mainland. Their prosperity was closely linked to the Communist regime. Many KMT intellectuals studied abroad on the mainland. They handed their academic destiny over to the mainland’s highly censored educational and research institutes.

In addition to having family businesses in China, KMT chairmen Lien Chan chose to follow the principle of “uniting with China to rule Taiwan” and proceeded to patronize and ingratiate himself with China. His political gains became deeply interdependent with Communist China’s totalitarian regime. With the above conditions, Hu Jintao decided that if the KMT came back into power then there was a possibility to quickly settle the Taiwan problem in a peaceful manner through a United Front instead of by force. Before the 2008 presidential elections were even over, Hu had already commanded a team to write a new political strategy for resolving the Taiwan problem on the premise that the KMT would win. The writing team was led by the chairman’s close aide Linghu Jihua and assisted by Wang Huning.

After Ma Yingjeou was elected as predicted, the Chinese government held an expanded Politburo meeting with departments involved in the Taiwan strategy. In order to keep the meeting confidential, the meeting was held at the primary strategic command center hidden deep within a cavern in Beijing’s Xi Shan. Those who attended the meeting, besides members of the Politburo, included members of the Secretariat, leaders of the Military, the State Council, the United Front Work Department, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of National Security. All together, roughly 200 people.

During Hu Jintao’s speech at the meeting, he remarked: “… Comrade Mao Zedong wisely mentioned early on that the United Front tactic was one of our party’s three most magic tools to defeat our enemies. After many years of strategic planning and an accumulation of efforts, we have made historical achievements in our United Front tactics over the KMT. Now that the KMT has regained power, it is possible for us to quickly settle the Taiwan problem in a peaceful manner. This is the true cause for rewriting our political strategies regarding Taiwan.”

During his speech, Hu Jintao especially recognized the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He said, “Through highly effective and incessant efforts, the Ministry of National Security was able to discover hard evidence of corruption in the Chen Shuibian family. Moreover, patriotic Taiwanese businessmen revealed bribery attempts made by the Chen family. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also attained evidence. After much effort, they were able to convince the US government to help us in persuading the Swiss Bank and the Singaporean government to strategically disclose the Chen family corruption and hand the evidence over to the Taiwanese judicial authorities. According to our understanding, Chen Shuibian will be arrested very soon. His arrest will be a huge blow to the Taiwan Independence forces. It will also strengthen the KMT’s influence in Taiwan. During this time of cooperation, the US also mentioned that international relation conditions are in favor for us to quickly and peacefully settle the Taiwan problem. The US definitely sees “Taiwan Independence” as a trouble point. Right now, it is Japan’s attitude on handing over the evidence on Chen’s corruption that is uncertain. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must strengthen foreign relations with Japan. As soon as Japan agrees to hand over the evidence, the effect will surpass the case itself. It will help dissolve the relations between Japan and Taiwan Independence forces.”

Three documents were passed during this meeting: Political Strategy for Solving the Taiwan Problem, Preparation Plan for Military Combat with Taiwan, and Political Plans for Taiwan Unification. The most pressing is the first document.

In the Political Strategy for Solving the Taiwan Problem, China’s new political strategy and mission under Taiwan’s new political climate is described as follows: “The entire CCP must grasp onto the opportunity of having the KMT back in power. By 2012, before the 18th Congress, we must settle the Taiwan problem without a battle through more aggressive political, economical, cultural, and social United Front tactics. We must complete the unification mission of our ancestors. We must destroy the conspiracy of opposition efforts within and outside of China to use Taiwan’s so-called ‘democratic experience’ to topple Chinese Socialism.” This document also set out guidelines and directions for United Front tactics programs regarding politics, economics, society and culture. These programs will later be explained in their own chapter.

The Political Strategy for Solving the Taiwan Problem finishes with: “Beneath the presumption that we are continuing our economic development, the entire party and military must focus on our political strategies to settle the Taiwan problem without a battle by 2012. Foreign affairs, internal affairs, the military, public security, national security, and propaganda efforts must all proactively assist the United Front efforts towards Taiwan … … We must fully understand that resolving the Taiwan Problem directly links to the existence of our Socialist System. … … While continuing our United Front tactics to peacefully take Taiwan, the entire party and military must also incessantly prepare for military action. Settling the Taiwan Problem by 2012 and achieving unification was written in Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s will. It is also the political promise that the current party members have made to uphold the wisdom of our elders, the proletarian revolutionaries. We can only succeed, not be defeated.”

Not rational

The reaction of some Taiwanese when they first hear about Communist China’s political strategies is shock. They cannot believe that these tactics are real. These Taiwanese then claim that such political strategies are “irrational.”

These Taiwanese are exactly on the mark – Communist China’s political plans are irrational. However, these Taiwanese have not yet realized that all totalitarian regimes have one thing in common. That is, their logistics are irrational, but the execution of their tactics are highly rational.

Why do totalitarian regimes have irrational logistics? To answer this question, we can look to Aristotle’s philosophies on “rule by persons” and “rule of law.” Perhaps he can help enlighten us.

Aristotle believed that rule of laws was superior to rule by persons. This is because man is a combination of reason and emotion. Therefore, man has a proclivity to be emotionally subjective when ruling. However, because man also has reason in addition to emotions, he is able to create something that exceeds the individual. Thus, it exceeds emotions and is made purely rational. This system of reason is law. Thus, rule of law is rational governing.

Aristotle’s philosophy helps us to understand the irrational logistics of totalitarian regimes. Totalitarianism is the same as “rule by persons”. Dictators or the oligarchy determine military logistics based on their own personal emotions. Such logistics can not be rational, but irrational. For example, China’s political strategies regarding Taiwan are based on the love-hate relationships and the grudges held by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and a few others. The will, hope, emotions, and interests of the Taiwanese people are completely ignored. How can political logistics that have no disregard for the Taiwanese people be rational?

2. Hu Jintao’s psychological factors effect political strategy regarding Taiwan

Is it the absurdity of history, or ridiculousness of human nature?

Under a democratic government, power resides in the law. The law is founded in the wills and interests of the citizens. Under a totalitarian government, power resides in the personal will of the dictator or the oligarchy. The current Political strategies for solving the Taiwan Problem is the focus of excitement for Chinese officials’ will of power. Thus, the final tactic in this political strategy is based on the mental state of the Chinese leadership. It is only after we peel away all the flowery official language that we will discover exactly how sly, insane, and ridiculous Communist China’s plan for solving the Taiwan problem really is. First, we must investigate the nature and psychological state of the CCP leader Hu Jintao.

Within a totalitarian regime, people must rely on servile personalities and the art of flattery to be promoted. This is because being servile is the basic logic behind totalitarian governance. It is a regime full of conspiracy. Thus, fancy fabrications of deceit and guile are personal traits that are required in order to survive and flourish in an autarchy. The fundamental political activities are fulfilling the greed and glory of the dictator. Therefore, the focus of a tyrant is his drive for power.

to stand out from some 20 million corrupt officials and come out on top is not easy. Besides fate giving you an opportunity, you must also be the epitome of servility, deceit, and guile. You must make seeking power your only ambition in life. Hu Jintao is exactly such a person.

To Hu Jintao, greed and power are the only things worth living for. However, these values are not based on any belief system; rather, they arise from physical reasons. In 1984, before Hu became provincial Committee Secretary of Guizhou, he was diagnosed with a severe case of diabetes. The diabetes caused impotence and a rigid diet. In a place famous for its beautiful women, Hu could not frolic as he pleased. In a province known for its fine liquor, he could not drink his fill of the famous Chinese liquor, Moutai.

How could Hu be content with just being frustrated? Gluttony and lust are human nature. Under the suppression of these two basic human desires, the lust for power became the only interest in Hu’s life. One might say this was “a blessing in disguise.” Although diabetes resulted in impotence and a highly restricted diet, Hu was able to fully focus on his pursuit for power without distraction. Thus, a regular nobody became the paramount leader of Communist China.

In China, a less famous official has played a significant role in Hu Jintao’s life. This man is Wang Sanyun. He has a great love for women, money, and above all, alcohol.

When Hu Jintao first arrived in Guizhou as the provincial Committee Secretary, Wang was only a deputy director at the Youth Leader Office of the Provincial Organization Department. By chance however, Wang’s wife was working at Guizhou Normal University during Hu’s first inspection at the school. A good looking, kind, and charismatic woman, she arranged Hu’s hospitality during his visit. This is how Wang’s wife became involved with Hu.

A eunuch still feels desire. Hu was just impotent. From then on, Wang quickly rose in the ranks in Guizhou. Some people mocked Wang saying that he was selling his wife for glory. While drunk, Wang declared to a group of fellow officials that, “My wife has told me, ‘Hu’s thing is not nice to look at, and it is useless.’ ” These words spread like wildfire among Guizhou’s officials and became an expression used to describe faulty goods.

To avoid being noticed, Wang was constantly transferred positions. He transferred from Deputy Secretary of Guizhou to Deputy Secretary of Sichuan, and then Fujian. After the 17th Congress, he was appointed by Hu as the Governor of Anhui.

The above paragraphs introduce Wang Sanyun as background for an incident in which Wang described Hu Jintao. In the winter of 2003, Wang made a secret trip from Fujian to Guizhou for a few days in order to transfer part of his family accounts abroad.

Before he left, Wang binge drank with a couple of his close officer friends and a fortune teller who specialized in face reading. This same fortune teller had first told Wang that Hu had “knives hidden behind his smile, and will someday possess great power.” It was after hearing this that Wang decided to win over Hu at all costs. Completely inebriated, Wang declared: “… … whoever you keep, you might as well keep Hu Jintao. You can offend Jiang Zemin, but never offend Hu Jintao. Everyday Hu lives like a monk. He can not eat, can not drink, he can not even have women. All he is left with is pondering on how to play with power. Playing with power is the same as playing with people. I bet he is more addicted to playing with power than playing with women. … … After Hu becomes the chairman of the Central Military Commission next year, he must solve the Taiwan problem. Just think, if there is a stunning beauty standing in front of you or a hundred year old Moutai under your nose, would you let them go without playing or drinking? For our General Secretary Hu, power is his beauty and Moutai. If he possesses great power, then he will use it. He will use his power to achieve the greatest victory on earth. Right now, for our party, the greatest victory we can achieve is solving the Taiwan Problem.”

Although Hu Jintao possessed all of the personality traits and psychological characters to become a dictator, his career was not always smooth sailing. In the 1980s, when Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, and Wang Zhaoguo and other leaders with deep ties to the Communist Youth League of China lost influence, the dominant Chinese diehards began to question the reliability of leaders with Youth League background. Naturally, Hu Jintao, who was once First Secretary of the Youth League, came under suspicion as well. Hu was transferred from the Provincial Committee Secretary of Guizhou to Provincial Committee Secretary of Tibet.

being transferred to an outlying region like Tibet is very much like being relegated to exile. Moreover, historically speaking, Committee Secretaries of Tibet were rarely promoted from their positions. It suddenly seemed like Hu’s political career had come to an end. Still suffering from his diabetes, the disheartened Hu left Tibet soon after his arrival. He went back to Beijing to receive treatment for his diabetes.

Then, in 1989 came a turning point in Hu's life. Earlier in the year, while still being treated in Beijing, Hu received a document from the CCP Committee in Tibet. The document was based on findings from secret investigations made by the Ministry of Public Security. It claimed that Tibetan monks planned to launch an uprising in March.

Initially, Hu did not find the document important. Then, however, Ling Jihua, Hu’s personal secretary during his term as Central Secretary, came to him. It is understood among Chinese officials that an officer and his secretary hold a very close master-servant relationship. When Ling discovered the contents of the document, he advised Hu Jintao to: first, immediately return to Tibet and prepare to put down the Tibetan monks protests; and secondly, once the uprising begins, immediately suppress it in a conspicuous manner. Ling pointed out that this could be the Hu’s last opportunity to get ahead in his career. Only such a major event could bring about a turning point in Hu’s personal destiny.


Hu Jintao accepted Ling Jihua’s advice and quickly returned to Tibet. In March of 1989, without instruction from the Central Government, Hu took military command. Under the banner of his position as CCP Committee member in Tibet, he compelled Tibetan paramilitary groups and police to enter Lhasa fully armed to suppress a peaceful demonstration of the Tibetan monks through massacre. Hu himself completely defied Chinese government regulations. Though only a civil service worker, he donned a helmet and automatic weapon and earnestly led the massacre.

According to a classified document in the Tibetan Public Security office, over one thousand and three hundred monks were arrested during the massacre, four hundred and eighty “insurgents” were killed on the spot, and another one hundred and twenty-three died of injuries or suicide in prison. Who would have known that Hu Jintao, this stiff reserved man who smiled like an un-wilting plastic flower, could be so cold-blooded that even some Chinese military elders were shocked? Even officials who had worked with Hu in the past that found this incident unthinkable.

I predict that the atrocities Hu inflicted on the Tibetan monks will show themselves again at the crucial moment in Solving the Taiwan Problem.

With his own bloody hands stained from the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Deng decided to hand the power over to Hu Jintao, whose hands were stained with the blood of the Tibetan people.

Deng Xiaoping, this sly aging politician, knew that this would be the only way in which he would evade responsibility for Tiananmen’s bloodshed after his own death. At the time, Deng had no other choice but to allow Jiang Zemin to become General Secretary because of the substantial support Jiang had from Li Xiannian and Chen Yun.

Through a series of political arrangements Deng skipped a generation to secure Hu as future paramount leader of Communist China. Moreover, in his political will, he “bestowed” the power and credit of solving The Taiwan Problem to Hu. Of course these arrangements were not made simply due to Deng’s personal favoritism towards Hu. The ingenious Deng knew that to avoid being held responsible for the Tiananmen massacre after his own death, he would need to strengthen the power of another murderer like himself, Hu Jintao.

The one thing Deng was most afraid of was that his successors would choose to “redress” the Tiananmen Square Incident. Under the CCP, this would mean that Deng Xiaoping and his family would lose all political backing and be charged with the heinous crimes of massacring the students and citizens of Beijing.

In conclusion, the personal psychological factors driving Hu Jintao to solve the Taiwan Problem by 2012 involve the following:

First, by autumn of 2012, Hu Jintao will be completing his 2nd term. According to policy he should hand over power during Communist China’s 18th Congress. For a dictator, handing over power is more difficult than handing over his own life. Therefore, if a major event occurs during the process of solving the Taiwan Problem, or if a major event is deliberately created, then Hu will have a reason to delay the 18th Congress. Moreover, he will have reason to prolong his position as paramount leader of China.

Second, even if Hu Jintao does not find a reason to prolong his term, if he is able to “achieve great accomplishments” such as solving the Taiwan Problem during his term then he will he be able to solidify his place in CCP history. Moreover, he will have greater insurance that his family wealth, accumulated through corruption, will be safe after he has stepped down.

Third, successfully solving the Taiwan Problem will allow Hu to obtain a definite political advantage against his opponents in the power struggles within the CCP. He will be able to arrange the core leadership of the next generation to his own interests. This way, even if he must hand over power, he will still be able to exert considerable power from behind the scenes as an Emperor Emeritus.

To solve the Taiwan Problem, China has two basic tactics to choose from, military force or non-violent United Front tactics. The Chinese military advocates using force. A military victory would help military personnel to strengthen their political, economical, and social status. However Hu Jintao has no military background. Thus in a military operation, Hu would only be a political puppet. It would be difficult for him to play “national hero.” Moreover, if Taiwan is taken by force, the power and political influence of military generals would increase and threaten Hu’s leadership position. On the contrary, using bribery and “United Front tactics” to peacefully take over Taiwan without a battle will ensure that Hu maintains the highest leadership throughout the process. Solving the Taiwan Problem would be Hu Jintao’s personal “outstanding accomplishment.” With the KMT back in power, the pro-Communist political maneuvers of upper class KMT members provide Hu with realistic foundations for China to “take Taiwan without a battle.”

The tactical plans for executing United Front tactics in taking Taiwan aroused extreme hostility from the Chinese military. To placate the military, Hu Jintao also had Ling Jihua direct and write the “Preparation Plan for Military Combat with Taiwan.” The details of this plan will be discussed in the following chapters. Besides simply appeasing the military, another motive hides behind Hu’s decision to “take without a battle” in alliance to “military plans.” The plans call for small battles during United Front operations in order to provide reason for China to declare a State of Emergency. Under a State of Emergency, Hu could justify delaying the 18th Congress and thus continue his position as paramount leader.

When Taiwan first opened tourism to Chinese tourists, Ma Yingjeou purposely rallied everyone into high spirits. Many Taiwanese had high hopes that Chinese tourists would rain from the sky like a “timely rain shower” bringing business opportunity to Taiwan. However, during the first couple months, only a few hundred Chinese tourists visited Taiwan each day. Most of the newly built tourist attractions had to be shut down. Investors faced devastating loses.

The CCP elite market economy system had started entering its own crisis. Coupled with the global economic crisis, most mainlanders did not have the financial capabilities to travel. Moreover, the Chinese State Department did not support large scale public funding for Taiwan tourism.

In October of 2008, a report from the Chinese United Front Department to the Chinese Secretariat disclosed that the number of Chinese tourists to Taiwan was much lower than expected and was beginning to affect Ma Yingjeou’s reputation in Taiwan. It might even negatively impact Ma’s strategic policies to strengthen economic ties with China.

Within three days of this report being submitted, Ling Jihua led the Chinese Secretariat to develop resolutions in response. Classified as top-secret, the resolutions established a team that is led by the United Front Department and includes the State Administration for Taxation (SAT) and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC). This team aims to encourage thriving businesses invested in by overseas Chinese (excluding Taiwanese businesses) and private enterprises in China to fund company trips to Taiwan. The SAT and SAIC will give special benefits to businesses that positively respond to this call.

On the other hand, businesses who do not respond will receive stricter management by law. Any kind of illegal activity involving industry, commerce, or taxation, will be investigated immediately and punished severely. The team must also actively encourage businesses in other industries to fund company trips as well.

These resolutions demand that until 2012, the United Front Department must cooperate with the SAT, SAIC, and the National Tourism Administration to ensure that five hundred thousand people visit Taiwan each year. Moreover, “the above departments must take this responsibility for the party and the people and treat this mission as a vitally important political mission.”

Under the extortion of Communist China’s tyrannical rule, businesses will continue to fund company trips to Taiwan and the annual number will likely reach five hundred thousand. However, a tourist economy brought about by a political mission with an expiration date in 2012 will only obliterate Taiwan. China will collect the interest for its financial investment in Taiwan’s tourist economy in 2012 when Taiwan’s freedom becomes a political slave to the Chinese Communist totalitarian regime.

4. Conclusion

Although politicians and scholars do not participate in construction, agriculture, business, or even scientific research, society supports them for specific social functions. One of the most crucial aspects of these social functions is to alert society when danger arises – politicians with their political sensitivities and scholars with their intelligence and knowledge. Sadly, until today, Taiwanese politicians and scholars have failed Taiwan.

Right now a political crisis is moving in on Taiwan like dark clouds bearing down on a city and threatens to crush it. Communist China has meticulously fabricated curtain of flowery lies to blind the common Taiwanese from seeing the truth. Now is the time that Taiwan needs great politicians and intellectuals. And yet, this is what we are bearing witness to –

As history will attest, many KMT politicians, Ma Yingjeou and other perverse government officials, avaricious scholars, and vulgar public speakers happily perpetuate Chinese fabrications. They attempt to make the Taiwanese believe that Communist China has changed. They argue that after countless acts against humanity, causing tragedy after tragedy in their society, these corrupt Chinese officials have found their moral conscience and turned over a new leaf. They have evolved from blood thirsty tyrants into good Samaritans that will forever bring prosperity and peace to Taiwan.

This group of low politicians and shameless scholars are aiding China in promoting lies. They are also endorsing the tyrannical regime’s campaign against freedom. No matter how this crises ends, whether Taiwan’s freedom is overthrown or the Taiwanese are triumphant, history will curse and never forgive these impudent politicians and scholars.

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